Some Moral Principles

Some Moral Principles

1. Principle of Double Effect (From Ashley, B. and Kevin O’Rourke, Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis, 4^thEdition (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 191-95. See also: Marquis, D.B., "Four Versions of Double Effect," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 16 (1991): 515-44; Cataldo, P.J., "The Principle of the Double Effect," Ethics & Medics, 20 (March 1995): 1-3.)

An action that is good in itself that has two effects--an intended and otherwise not reasonably attainable good effect, and an unintended yet foreseen evil effect--is licit, provided there is a due proportion between the intended good and the permitted evil.

When there is a clash between the two universal norms of "do good" and "avoid evil," the question arises as to whether the obligation to avoid evil requires one to abstain from a good action in order to prevent a foreseen but merely permitted concomitant evil effect. The answer is that one need not always abstain from a good action that has foreseen bad effects, depending on certain moral criteria identified in the principle of double effect.

A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good effect and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time:

1.       that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;

2.      that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;

3.      that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;

4.      that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.

The conditions include the explicit requirement that the bad effect not be intended.

Formulations of the principle of double effect

Thomas Aquinas is credited with introducing the principle of double effect in his discussion of the permissibility of self-defense in the Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7). Killing one's assailant is justified, he argues, provided one does not intend to kill him. Aquinas observes that “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. … Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects: one, the saving of one's life; the other, the slaying of the aggressor.”

As Aquinas's discussion continues, a justification is provided that rests on characterizing the defensive action as a means to a goal that is justified: “Therefore, this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in being as far as possible.” However, Aquinas observes, the permissibility of self-defense is not unconditional: “And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore, if a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful, whereas, if he repel force with moderation, his defense will be lawful.”

Later versions of the double effect principle all emphasize the distinction between causing a morally grave harm as a side effect of pursuing a good end and causing a harm as a means of pursuing a good end. We can summarize this by noting that for certain categories of morally grave actions, for example, causing the death of a human being, the principle of double effect combines a special permission for incidentally causing death for the sake of a good end (when it occurs as a side effect of one's pursuit of that end) with a general prohibition on instrumentally causing death for the sake of a good end (when it occurs as part of one's means to pursue that end). The prohibition is absolute in traditional Catholic applications of the principle. 

Applications

Many morally reflective people have been persuaded that something along the lines of double effect must be correct. No doubt this is because at least some of the examples cited as illustrations of DE have considerable intuitive appeal:

1. The tactical bomber aims at military targets while foreseeing that bombing such targets will cause civilian deaths. When his bombs kill civilians this is a foreseen but unintended consequence of his actions. Even if it is equally certain that the two bombers will cause the same number of civilian deaths, terror bombing is impermissible while tactical bombing is permissible.
2. A doctor who intends to hasten the death of a terminally ill patient by injecting a large dose of morphine would act impermissibly because he intends to bring about the patient's death. However, a doctor who intended to relieve the patient's pain with that same dose and merely foresaw the hastening of the patient's death would act permissibly. 
3. A doctor who believed that abortion was wrong, even in order to save the mother's life, might nevertheless consistently believe that it would be permissible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with cancer. In carrying out the hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman's life while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus. Performing an abortion, by contrast, would involve intending to kill the fetus as a means to saving the mother.
4. To kill a person whom you know to be plotting to kill you would be impermissible because it would be a case of intentional killing; however, to strike in self-defense against an aggressor is permissible, even if one foresees that the blow by which one defends oneself will be fatal.
5. It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.
6. Sacrificing one's own life in order to save the lives of others can be distinguished from suicide by characterizing the agent's intention: a soldier who throws himself on a live grenade intends to shield others from its blast and merely foresees his own death; by contrast, a person who commits suicide intends to bring his or her own life to an end.

2.  Scandal  (From McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology, On Scandal. McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology (Wagner, 1958), Vol. I, p. 584, 585, and pp. 600-604.)

Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) in its wide sense, it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on others. (h) in its strict sense, it refers to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

 The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed in its wide sense:

(a) It is used to signify physical or natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner that lie laid a scandal (calumny) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a scandal to the crown.

 (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

Definition of Scandal

In the strict sense, scandal is defined as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”

(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is, sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as being such. 

(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the wide senses given in the previous paragraph. 

(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by scandal. 

(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.

Causes of Scandal

There are various divisions of scandal according to the kinds of external acts.

 (a) There is scandal in words, as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people.

(b) There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements or announcements on one’s billboards.

 (c) There also may be scandal in omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: 

(a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions;

(b) external acts concealed from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.

Duty of Avoiding Scandal

At times it is impossible to avoid giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered:

(a) When is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

 (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal

(a) Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking undeserved offense. 

(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others. Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14). 

(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning, even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt., vii. 6). Example: A wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery. 

(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own, are in spiritual need, Hence, one should conceal or delay the performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present. If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part. 

3. Cooperation in Evil

Cooperation in evil is the assistance or collaboration in another person’s evil deed. This covers a wide gamut of actions, from the different types of complicity to material cooperation.

This is different from scandal which is inciting another to commit a sin, but any kind of cooperation influencing another’s decision to sin is morally equivalent to scandal – an extremely serious sin severely condemned by our Lord (cf. Mt 18:6-9). This would be the case of those teaching others how to do evil deeds, sinning so that others may imitate them or advising others to sin.

In cooperation in evil, there is no direct influence over the evil intention of the other: one’s cooperation just makes the other’s action possible or easier.

In order to judge the morality of cooperation in evil in specific cases, we must distinguish the different types of cooperation. The main distinction is between formal and material cooperation.

In formal cooperation in evil, one wants or consents to the other’s sin, with or without external manifestation.

In material cooperation in evil, the other’s evil act is neither wanted nor consented to. There is  collaboration as to the performance of the physical action, but he will neither wants to offend God nor wants the other to offend Him.

Depending on how close the collaboration in evil deed is, we can speak of mediate or immediate cooperation.

Immediate or direct cooperation assist in the performance of the sinful act itself, as the action of the anesthesiologist in an abortion.

Mediate or indirect cooperation only involves supplying the instrument to be used in another’s sin, as the selling of a weapon that the buyer will later use for a crime.

We can still make another distinction between proximate and remote cooperation, based on the degree of physical or moral closeness between that help that is given and the sin itself. This distinction is related to the preceding one, since direct cooperation is always proximate; indirect cooperation however, may be proximate or remote. For example, if a bank finances an abortion campaign, its directors cooperate in a proximate and mediate way. The depositors and stockholders, on the other hand, cooperate in a remote and mediate way by making it possible with their money.

Morality of Cooperation in Evil

The following criteria will allow us to judge the morality of cooperation in evil in specific cases:

Formal cooperation is always illicit. It implies wanting or consenting to another’s sin, which is in itself a sin.

Generally speaking, mere material cooperation is also illicit. Charity binds us to prevent inasmuch as possible our neighbor’s sins.

In some particular cases, material cooperation may be lawful in order to obtain a necessary good or avoid a great damage.

Charity does not bind us to avoid another person’s sin when this would cause us a great inconvenience, or require a disproportionate effort.

Obviously, cooperation is not lawful if there are other ways to obtain the good or  avoid the damage.

In material cooperation, the principle of double effect must also be followed. Its conditions are:

•       The action of the collaborator must be in itself good or indifferent.

•       The intention of the collaborator must be good.

•       There must be a proportionate cause to justify the cooperation.

The good effect sought should not be a consequence of the evil action to which one cooperates.

Right intention is needed in applying these principles to a possible  cooperation in evil.

In assessing the proportionate or reasonable cause mentioned, one must consider

–      the seriousness of the sin involved

–      the certainty that it will actually be committed

–      The closeness of the cooperation sought

–      The consequences for third parties.

Great rectitude is required to decide whether the cause is proportionate to the evil results of one’s cooperation.

Even when the above conditions have been met, there are still 2 other requirements:

-Scandal must be avoided. Others –especially persons with poor formation-may think one is consenting to the sin committed.

-Proximate occasions of sin must be avoided. Cooperating in other’s sins through good or indifferent actions often entails the danger of eventually consenting to those sins. 

Therefore, one must apply the proper means to remove the occasion of sin.

Cases raising the possibility of cooperation in evil pose complex moral problems. These must be studied in the presence of God.  One must be humble enough to ask for advice. Besides, a good Christian should have a positive outlook: cooperation in good, seeking and spreading the good, helping others to find Christ.