Some Moral
Principles
1. Principle of Double Effect (From
Ashley, B.
and Kevin O’Rourke, Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis, 4thEdition
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 191-95. See also: Marquis,
D.B., "Four Versions of Double Effect," Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy, 16 (1991): 515-44; Cataldo, P.J., "The Principle of
the Double Effect," Ethics & Medics, 20 (March 1995):
1-3.)
An action that is good in
itself that has two effects--an intended and otherwise not reasonably
attainable good effect, and an unintended yet foreseen evil effect--is licit,
provided there is a due proportion between the intended good and the permitted
evil.
When there is a clash between the two
universal norms of "do good" and "avoid evil," the question
arises as to whether the obligation to avoid evil requires one to abstain from
a good action in order to prevent a foreseen but merely permitted concomitant
evil effect. The answer is that one need not always abstain from a good action
that has foreseen bad effects, depending on certain moral criteria identified
in the principle of double effect.
A person may licitly perform an action
that he foresees will produce a good effect and a bad effect provided that four
conditions are verified at one and the same time:
1.
that the action in itself from its very
object be good or at least indifferent;
2.
that the good effect and not the evil
effect be intended;
3.
that the good effect be not produced by
means of the evil effect;
4.
that there be a proportionately grave
reason for permitting the evil effect.
The conditions
include the explicit requirement that the bad effect not be intended.
Thomas Aquinas is credited with
introducing the principle of double effect in his discussion of the
permissibility of self-defense in the Summa Theologica (II-II,
Qu. 64, Art.7). Killing one's assailant is justified, he argues, provided one
does not intend to kill him. Aquinas observes that “Nothing hinders one act
from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is
beside the intention. … Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two
effects: one, the saving of one's life; the other, the slaying of the
aggressor.”
As Aquinas's discussion continues, a
justification is provided that rests on characterizing the defensive action as
a means to a goal that is justified: “Therefore, this act, since one's
intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural
to everything to keep itself in being as far as possible.” However, Aquinas
observes, the permissibility of self-defense is not unconditional: “And yet,
though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it
be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore, if a man in self-defense uses more
than necessary violence, it will be unlawful, whereas, if he repel force with
moderation, his defense will be lawful.”
Later versions of the double effect
principle all emphasize the distinction between causing a morally grave harm as
a side effect of pursuing a good end and causing a harm as a means of pursuing
a good end. We can summarize this by noting that for certain categories of
morally grave actions, for example, causing the death of a human being, the
principle of double effect combines a special permission for incidentally
causing death for the sake of a good end (when it occurs as a side effect of
one's pursuit of that end) with a general prohibition on instrumentally causing
death for the sake of a good end (when it occurs as part of one's means to
pursue that end). The prohibition is absolute in traditional Catholic
applications of the principle.
Many morally reflective people have
been persuaded that something along the lines of double effect must be correct.
No doubt this is because at least some of the examples cited as illustrations
of DE have considerable intuitive appeal:
- The tactical bomber aims at military targets
while foreseeing that bombing such targets will cause civilian deaths.
When his bombs kill civilians this is a foreseen but unintended
consequence of his actions. Even if it is equally certain that the two
bombers will cause the same number of civilian deaths, terror bombing is
impermissible while tactical bombing is permissible.
- A doctor who intends to hasten the death of a terminally ill
patient by injecting a large dose of morphine would act impermissibly
because he intends to bring about the patient's death. However, a doctor
who intended to relieve the patient's pain with that same dose and merely
foresaw the hastening of the patient's death would act permissibly.
- A doctor who believed that abortion was wrong, even in order to
save the mother's life, might nevertheless consistently believe that it
would be permissible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with
cancer. In carrying out the hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the
woman's life while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus. Performing an
abortion, by contrast, would involve intending to kill the fetus as a
means to saving the mother.
- To kill a person whom you know to be plotting to kill you would be
impermissible because it would be a case of intentional killing; however,
to strike in self-defense against an aggressor is permissible, even if one
foresees that the blow by which one defends oneself will be fatal.
- It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway
trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the
track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of
saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley
onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case
one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but
one does not intend it.
- Sacrificing one's own life in order to save the lives of others can
be distinguished from suicide by characterizing the agent's intention: a
soldier who throws himself on a live grenade intends to shield others from
its blast and merely foresees his own death; by contrast, a person who
commits suicide intends to bring his or her own life to an end.
2. Scandal (From McHugh and Callan,
Moral Theology, On Scandal. McHugh and Callan, Moral
Theology (Wagner, 1958), Vol. I, p. 584, 585, and pp. 600-604.)
Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap
prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble
or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a
strict or special sense. (a) in its wide sense, it refers to any
kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on
others. (h) in its strict sense, it refers to a fall into sin which
one occasions for others by misconduct.
The following are some examples of the
word “scandal” as employed in its wide sense:
(a) It is used to signify physical or
natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the plagues brought
on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner
that lie laid a scandal (calumny) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20).
Those who spread defamatory gossip are called scandal-mongers,
and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or disgrace, as when
Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a scandal to the crown.
(b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify
moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense
given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is
described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some
more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as
entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to
scandalize.
Definition of Scandal
In the strict sense,
scandal is defined as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and
that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”
(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of
acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is
committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal
thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.
(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that
is, sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not
scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as
being such.
(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin,
great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the
wide senses given in the previous paragraph.
(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it
sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that
the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a
person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by
scandal.
(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize
himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion
of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a
virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood
of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.
Causes of Scandal
There are various divisions of scandal
according to the kinds of external acts.
(a) There is scandal in words, as profane
language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people.
(b) There is scandal in acts, as when
one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to
things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as
disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful
objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene
advertisements or announcements on one’s billboards.
(c) There also may be scandal in omission, as
when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.
The following kinds of sinful acts are
not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin:
(a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions;
(b) external acts concealed from
others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others,
omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.
Duty of Avoiding Scandal
At times it is impossible to avoid
giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. Hence,
on this point there are two questions to be considered:
(a) When is one obliged to surrender
spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?
(b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal
goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?
The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal
(a) Spiritual goods that are so
necessary that one cannot give them up without committing sin may not be
surrendered; for, according to the order of charity, one must be more
solicitous to keep oneself from sin than to preserve others, and moreover a
good end does not justify sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit
mortal or even venial sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may
not tone down the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from
blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking undeserved
offense.
(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be neglected
on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as there is a good reason
which calls for their use; for the person who takes malicious scandal from
these spiritual things is in difficulty through his own fault and can rescue
himself, and it is not reasonable that his malice should be permitted to impede
the benefit of others. Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be
given the scandal which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).
(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be neglected on
account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason for their use; for
one should not give another an occasion of sinning, even if the other is in bad
faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our Lord declared that the act of
teaching truth to others should be omitted, if it would only provoke rejection
(Matt., vii. 6). Example: A wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer
moves her husband to mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.
(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be omitted on
account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains scandal from
weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one assist those who are in
spiritual need, and persons who are in danger of scandal through no fault, or
through a slight fault of their own, are in spiritual need, Hence, one should
conceal or delay the performance of good works that are not necessary, if they
would scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the
righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works before
those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await such a time as
will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad faith. Examples: If a
person knows that personal acts of piety which he performs seem to some
well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake their faith, he should omit
these acts when such persons are present. If parents are scandalized because a
child wishes to leave them in order to become a priest or a religious, the
child should delay for a while, if there is hope of a change of view on their
part.
3.
Cooperation in Evil
Cooperation in evil is the assistance or collaboration
in another person’s evil deed. This covers a wide gamut of actions, from the
different types of complicity to material cooperation.
This is different from scandal which is inciting
another to commit a sin, but any kind of cooperation influencing another’s
decision to sin is morally equivalent to scandal – an extremely serious sin
severely condemned by our Lord (cf. Mt 18:6-9). This would be the case of those
teaching others how to do evil deeds, sinning so that others may imitate them
or advising others to sin.
In cooperation in evil, there is no direct influence
over the evil intention of the other: one’s cooperation just makes the other’s
action possible or easier.
In order to judge the morality of cooperation in evil
in specific cases, we must distinguish the different types of cooperation. The
main distinction is between formal and material cooperation.
In formal cooperation in evil, one wants
or consents to the other’s sin, with or without external manifestation.
In material cooperation in evil, the
other’s evil act is neither wanted nor consented to. There is collaboration as to the performance of the
physical action, but he will neither wants to offend God nor wants the other to
offend Him.
Depending on how close the collaboration in evil deed
is, we can speak of mediate or immediate cooperation.
Immediate or direct cooperation assist
in the performance of the sinful act itself, as the action of the
anesthesiologist in an abortion.
Mediate or indirect cooperation only
involves supplying the instrument to be used in another’s sin, as the selling
of a weapon that the buyer will later use for a crime.
We can still make another distinction between
proximate and remote cooperation, based on the degree of physical or moral
closeness between that help that is given and the sin itself. This distinction
is related to the preceding one, since direct cooperation is always proximate;
indirect cooperation however, may be proximate or remote. For example, if a
bank finances an abortion campaign, its directors cooperate in a proximate and
mediate way. The depositors and stockholders, on the other hand, cooperate in a
remote and mediate way by making it possible with their money.
Morality of Cooperation in Evil
The following criteria will allow us to judge the
morality of cooperation in evil in specific cases:
Formal cooperation is always illicit. It implies
wanting or consenting to another’s sin, which is in itself a sin.
Generally speaking, mere material cooperation is also
illicit. Charity binds us to prevent inasmuch as possible our neighbor’s sins.
In some particular cases, material cooperation may be
lawful in order to obtain a necessary good or avoid a great damage.
Charity does not bind us to avoid another person’s sin
when this would cause us a great inconvenience, or require a disproportionate
effort.
Obviously, cooperation is not lawful if there are
other ways to obtain the good or avoid
the damage.
In material cooperation, the principle of double
effect must also be followed. Its conditions are:
• The
action of the collaborator must be in itself good or indifferent.
• The
intention of the collaborator must be good.
• There
must be a proportionate cause to justify the cooperation.
The good effect sought should not be a consequence of
the evil action to which one cooperates.
Right intention is needed in applying these principles
to a possible cooperation in evil.
In assessing the proportionate or reasonable cause
mentioned, one must consider
– the
seriousness of the sin involved
– the
certainty that it will actually be committed
– The
closeness of the cooperation sought
– The
consequences for third parties.
Great rectitude is required to decide whether the
cause is proportionate to the evil results of one’s cooperation.
Even when the above conditions have been met, there
are still 2 other requirements:
-Scandal must be avoided. Others
–especially persons with poor formation-may think one is consenting to the sin
committed.
-Proximate occasions of sin must be
avoided. Cooperating in other’s sins through good or indifferent actions often
entails the danger of eventually consenting to those sins.
Therefore, one must
apply the proper means to remove the occasion of sin.
Cases raising the possibility of cooperation in evil
pose complex moral problems. These must be studied in the presence of God. One must be humble enough to ask for advice.
Besides, a good Christian should have a positive outlook: cooperation in good,
seeking and spreading the good, helping others to find Christ.
